Macroeconomic trouble and policy challenges in the wake of the financial bust by Asensio, Angel
Macroeconomic trouble and policy challenges in the
wake of the financial bust
Angel Asensio
To cite this version:
Angel Asensio. Macroeconomic trouble and policy challenges in the wake of the financial bust.
2010. <halshs-00496921>
HAL Id: halshs-00496921
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00496921
Submitted on 1 Jul 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
Macroeconomic trouble and policy challenges in the wake of the financial bust 
 
Angel Asensio 
CEPN, Université Paris 13 
May 2010 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Contrasting with the 1929 great crisis, authorities intervened forcefully in 2008 to stop the 
disintegration of the financial system. Governments and central banks then sought to revise 
the prudential regulation in depth. It would be optimistic, however, to believe that prudential 
measures, alone, could deliver full economic recovery, for the collapse of the 'state of 
confidence' has fed depressive forces and policy challenges which could hold for a while, 
even once the financial sector is made safe. On the one hand, the economic slowdown and the 
direct and indirect assistance provided by the governments to the private sectors are having a 
heavy impact on public finances, meanwhile, on the other hand, the massive amounts of 
money which artificially inflated the prices of housing and financial products could produce 
inflationary pressures in the post-crisis period, unless a new assets bubble is allowed for. 
Authorities could therefore be facing high unemployment in a damaged context of public 
deficits and inflationary pressures. The chapter aims at discussing these new challenges. The 
inadequacy of inflation targets and fiscal orthodoxy in a depressed economy is emphasized, 
and the outlines of a Post Keynesian alternative policy are examined. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Contrasting with the 1929 great crisis, authorities intervened forcefully in 2008 to stop the 
disintegration of the financial system. This was obtained by means of massive liquidity 
pumping and state guarantees over private assets which eventually reintroduced some 
confidence within the financial system, and stopped the process of depreciation of assets. A 
salient feature at the end of 2009 was the rapid recovery in the financial sector as compared 
with the lasting difficulties in the goods and labor markets. It was as if the pre-crisis financial 
euphoria had come back, but in a depressed context, at least in the countries that had been 
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involved in the financial turmoil. Such a discrepancy raises the nagging question of whether 
and how a depressed economic system could feed such high financial returns. In other words: 
did the authorities intervention fix the bubble and allow assets markets to start inflating again? 
 
It is not clear whether the markets practices are going to be severely constrained, but if the 
change in regulation principles is not constraining enough, old practices will hardly disappear 
spontaneously, so that a new bubble could hide difficulties one more time, until the next 
crisis. Of course, this should not be considered a safe solution for the authorities capacity to 
save the financial system and support the whole economy has been severely weakened, and 
authorities could hardly provide such a massive support again before having recovered, the 
knowledge of which would, in case of a new financial collapse, produce much more panics 
and catastrophic outcomes than in the previous case. Hence, although such a new bubble 
scenario looks plausible, this chapter concentrates on the case where, possibly after a future 
replica, safer financial regulation principles are eventually implemented so that the excess 
liquidity starts fuelling inflationary pressures in real estate, durables and speculative goods, 
instead of financial products1
 
. This scenario involves new challenges in terms of monetary 
and fiscal policy, for inflationary pressures in this case are concomitant of serious public 
finance deterioration, so that authorities are tempted to implement restrictive policies in a 
context of fragile economic recovery. 
The chapter first argues that, although depressive forces look to have been successfully 
stopped, there is little hope that the economies involved in the financial turmoil recover 
spontaneously the pre-crisis path. Then it is argued that monetary and fiscal policies have 
inherited difficulties in terms of public debt and excess liquidity that tend to induce restrictive 
responses. Finally, the inadequacy of orthodox monetary and fiscal policies in a context of 
depressed economies is emphasized and the outlines of an appropriate policy are examined. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Post Keynesians are not acquainted with the idea that inflationary pressures may arise below full 
employment, but as Victoria Chick pointed out, "there is nothing in [The General Theory] which 
actually impedes understanding of the conjunction of unemployment and inflation" (Chick 1983, p 
280). In fact, it can hardly be argued that financial assets inflation may develop below full 
employment and goods and services inflation cannot. The point is discussed further below. 
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I. Sluggish recovery 
 
The cause of the financial crisis triggered by the subprime episode has been located in the 
failure of prudential regulation (Davidson 2008, 2009)2
 
, but the necessary palliative which 
permitted getting out of the financial turmoil (though not to get out of lasting severe 
difficulties) was an unusual and massive intervention of public institutions aimed at protecting 
the financial system against complete chaos and the whole economy against much deeper 
depression. In fact, these defensive reactions (including support to aggregate demand) were 
not strictly aimed at stimulating the economy, but rather at stopping both the financial system 
disintegration and the deflationary process. That is, the expected result was obviously not to 
improve the performances of a safe economic system, but to save a dying patient at all costs, 
until the cause of the disease starts being dealt with. This is an important point for, although 
the financial markets and institutions looked much better after such an emergency medication, 
and although depressive forces looked to have been successfully stopped, there is little hope 
that the economy recovers spontaneously the pre-crisis path. 
The post-crisis growth path will be determined by the aggregate demand dynamism, which 
itself depends on financing conditions. As regards financial institutions, the memory of the 
collapse will certainly make banks and non-banks more prudent and selective as far as 
financing activities are concerned. This will be reinforced, more or less, by the new prudential 
regulations that are progressively implemented, so that one can reasonably expect some part 
of the riskier projects, which would have been financed in the pre-crisis euphoric climate, to 
be rejected in the future. Of course, it is not necessarily a bad thing, unless some projects are 
unduly rejected as a result of a kind of precautionary principle. Now, even if such a perverse 
effect can be avoided, it remains that financing conditions will hardly be easier than before 
the financial turmoil, and should actually be less generous. A memory effect is likely to 
influence portfolio decisions as well, for the post-crisis balance sheets of private and public 
financial institutions (including treasuries and central banks) should remain stuffed with lots 
of toxic assets for a while, so that further financial turmoil cannot be discarded. And such a 
                                                 
2 Palley (2009) "traces the roots of the current financial crisis to a faulty U.S. macroeconomic 
paradigm. One flaw in this paradigm was the neo-liberal growth model adopted after 1980 that relied 
on debt and asset price inflation to drive demand.[...] Deregulation and financial excess are important 
parts of the story, but they are not the ultimate cause of the crisis." 
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threat is likely to boost the liquidity preference, people wanting to limit the share of risky 
assets in their portfolio. As a matter of consequence, while the financial turmoil has ended, 
the long-term interest rates and the required return on equities could remain relatively high as 
compared with their pre-crisis level. Moreover, in spite of the stocks of reserves banks have 
accumulated during the rescue episode, bank-credit rates as well could take advantage of the 
situation and remain relatively high, for banks will be able to sell more credit without 
reducing their interest rates substantially as far as bonds and non-bank loan rates remain 
relatively high. 
 
Those worsened financing conditions in turn should make it more difficult for firms and 
households to maintain the pre-crisis level of expenditures as regards productive investments, 
housing and durable credit-financed consumption good. In addition, a degradation of the 
expected return on productive investments can also be feared. The inducement to invest 
should therefore be weakened both because of the sluggishness of the households’ demand for 
goods and because of the weakened “entrepreneurial spirit.” 
 
Hence, the illness has not been dealt with yet, and the cure requires both new financial 
regulations and public support to aggregate demand. As for the new financial regulations, the 
message seems to have been well understood by authorities, which committed to revise 
profoundly the rules of the game, at least in 2008-2009 until the markets started showing 
some resistance against constraining prudential regulation. We will see whether markets 
practices are going to be deeply constrained or not, but in the meantime, as the emergency 
measures got to save the patient by providing the private sector with the required liquidity and 
the required guaranty, both the central banks and governments have accumulated or 
guaranteed huge amounts of doubtful private assets. And this is likely to harm their capacity 
to support further the economy subsequently. 
 
II. Bogged down monetary and fiscal policies 
 
Dealing with public debts in depressed economies 
 
Public finances use to be severely damaged after a depression, both because of the collapse of 
fiscal revenues and because of the huge increase in the public expenditures that have been 
directly and indirectly induced by the support to the financial sector, to private companies and 
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to households (Bank for International Settlements, 2009, pp 91-115). Fiscal authorities 
accordingly seems to have a limited room for manoeuvre to counter the sluggish conditions of 
the private sector recovery (see however the discussion below), for markets tend to raise the 
risk premium on public debt interest rate for those countries which exhibit strongly 
deteriorated public accounts and repayment difficulties. As an increased risk premium would 
deteriorate further the situation and could trigger a dangerous vicious circle, governments in 
such circumstances are very tempted not to increase expenditures or reduce taxes, thereby 
renouncing to support the private sector. 
 
Of course, post-crisis economic recoveries use to alleviate public accounts spontaneously to 
some extent, but even in the optimistic case of a rapid return to the pre-crisis growth trajectory 
combined with a rapid reduction of the budget deficit, the level of the public debt is likely to 
remain higher than the pre-crisis one, for the past deficits do weight the debt burden as long as 
surpluses do not compensate for them. In the less favorable (but very plausible) circumstances 
where the recovery process spreads over a long period of time, owed to the weak aggregate 
demand dynamism and the weak public support, the post crisis growth regime should make it 
still more difficult for governments to balance their budget, which in turn allows for a 
growing public debt (fig. 1). 
 
 
                                                         sluggish recovery 
     increasing public                                                                   (weak public support) 
               debt 
                                                      lasting budget deficits 
 
Figure 1 
 
The current context in addition involves a worsening factor, which results from the different 
kind of government guarantees and purchases of private assets that have been made necessary 
in order to save the financial sectors, whatever it has operated directly (nationalization, 
recapitalization, loans...), or indirectly (state-guaranteed bad banks and other ad hoc 
specialized institutions). Part of these bad assets have been purchased or guaranteed when the 
markets lost their bearing in the storm. They are likely to be sealable at a price which will not 
involve any loss. But there are amounts of either purchased or state guaranteed private debts 
which will appear to be irrecoverable, or which market price could hardly reach again the 
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level at which they were purchased when some 'financial innovations' unduly inflated their 
value. Hence, unless a new bubble boosts again these assets value, public finances are likely 
to be affected by the depreciation of the stock of bad debts they purchased3. The problem is 
all the more detrimental since the corresponding amount of public money was not spent in any 
welfare-improving public goods or services. It was spent in depreciated assets, part of which 
will probably not bring back the money they have cost. And as no supplementary taxes or 
borrowed resources have been collected in order to pay for these assets, they simply 
contribute to make the public debt heavier4
 
. Which finally makes the pernicious process 
illustrated in figure 1 more difficult to get round.   
Bubbles and excess money 
 
Central banks also accepted bad collaterals in exchange of the liquidity which has been 
pumped into the banking sector. The central bank balance-sheets accordingly increased 
dramatically (Bank for International Settlements 2009, pp 91-110.). Optimistic views assert 
that one should not worry about the toxic collaterals central banks have been forced to buy in 
order to rescue the banking system. According to Davidson (2009), 
 
"These assets are called ‘toxic’ not because they are worthless in the sense that they 
may never generate a future cash inflow, they are ‘toxic’ because the market doesn’t 
know how to evaluate them. [...] we are going to make a profit because over the long 
run enough people are going to continue to pay their mortgages or whatever backs 
                                                 
3 See International Monetary Fund, 2009. 
4 For a quantitative appraisal see the International Monetary Fund Staff Position Note SPN/13/09. 
According to the Laeven and Valencia (2008, p 24) database on systemic banking crises, "Fiscal costs, 
net of recoveries, associated with crisis management can be substantial, averaging about 13.3 percent 
of GDP on average, and can be as high as 55.1 percent of GDP. Recoveries of fiscal outlays vary 
widely as well, with the average recovery rate reaching 18.2 percent of gross fiscal costs. While 
countries that used asset management companies seem to achieve slightly higher recovery rates, the 
correlation is very small, at about 10 percent. Finally, output losses (measured as deviations from trend 
GDP) of systemic banking crises can be large, averaging about 20 percent of GDP on average during 
the first four years of the crisis, and ranging from a low of 0 percent to a high of 98 percent of GDP." 
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these exotic financial assets so we will make a profit on it, which says that these things 
have a value, but we don’t know what that value is." 
 
Horn (2008, p 6) however reported that 
 
" [...] it is not guaranteed that the ECB can sell them with profits. The ECB takes this 
into account to some extent by applying a uniform haircut add-on between 5 and 10 % 
and other down payments." 
 
Anyway, those possible losses are the tree which hides the wood. Even if the central banks 
were able to withdraw all the liquidities they pumped into the banking sector during the 
rescue episode5, it remains that banking systems, especially in the U.S., created huge amounts 
of money to finance private purchases (notably house purchases and real estate investments) 
in exchange of repay commitments that eventually were not honoured, or only partially. 
Hence, important amounts of bad money had been (endogenously) pumped in exchange of 
bad debts for a long time when the crisis started. The bubble in the housing sector was 
obviously fuelled by such an excess credit-money6
 
. The massive "securitization" 
subsequently helped to disseminate asset-prices inflation internationally, since the bad quality 
of the toxic assets was dissimulated, thereby allowing for overvaluation in international 
markets. 
When the bubble burst, and the real value of real and financial assets collapsed, the excess 
money which still was circulating (since it had not been withdrawn, as part of the related 
private debts could not be honoured), was first absorbed by a dramatic increase in the demand 
                                                 
5 It might be not that easy in the fragile post-crisis context, because it could be dangerous to put back 
lots of toxic assets into circulation in order to withdraw liquidity. Horn (2008, pp 8) statement that 
"The ECB just has to sell the assets she has bought during the crisis" sounds therefore somewhat 
optimistic too. 
6 Excess money does not refer here to an excess of the supply over the demand for money, which 
would be inconsistent with the Post Keynesian approach to endogenous money, where the money 
supply sticks to the demand; it refers to the notion of 'bad money' as defined above. , that is, money 
that has been provided endogenously but that subsequently has turned out to be in excess because of 
some counterpart failure. 
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for liquidity and other secure holdings (quasi-money, low-risk liquid assets, gold ...). But, as 
the new financial regulations were not implemented rapidly and therefore financial product 
became very attractive again (all the more since authorities had provided state guaranty in 
order to rescue the financial sector), the asset-prices inflation process started again7
 
. 
The financial assets overvaluation might continue, or even develop, until another financial 
collapse stops that unsafe process once again. But let us examine the implications if the 
financial rules are strongly enough reinforced so that the financial markets become much less 
attractive. Liquidities in this case would try to make profit from purchases of durable and 
capital goods, oil, gold... instead of financial assets. It is true that, according to the Post 
Keynesian literature, inflation cannot arise below full employment. This is obviously true in 
normal times where credit-money endogenously finances safe productive investments, so that 
the return on investment which is required to repay the money initially borrowed eventually 
proves to be sufficient. In this case, the money inflows and outflows ensure that no excess 
money circulates in the economy. Now, in troubled times where amounts of credit-money 
which has been previously created cannot be destroyed by a normal outflow, an excess 
purchasing power unduly remains in the economy, thereby allowing for an increase in the 
money value of some goods and real assets (unless a shift in the liquidity preference increases 
the money demand proportionally). Hence, with respect to the current situation, when the 
recovery process reaches the pre-crisis level, producers will hardly be able to provide within 
normal delays the additional amount of goods that the excess amount of money could 
purchase at previous prices, all the more so as the existing capacity is likely to have suffered 
during the depression (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2009, p 31-
                                                 
7 The financial markets recovery of 2009 is documented for example in International Monetary Fund 
2010, p 1. 
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33)8. A Demand-pull inflation process therefore may very well develop in a context of 
unemployment, insofar as the pre-crisis level of unemployment is below full employment9
 
, 
The magnitude of such inflationary pressures (or the magnitude of the policy measures that 
could be adopted in order to fight them) depends on the authorities capacity to withdraw the 
bad money rapidly enough as to offset the decrease of the liquidity preference10
 
. There is 
technically no major problem to withdraw liquidity from the economy, but as stated above, it 
is not clear at all that such a policy could be implemented without damaging the financial 
system and the fragile economic recovery. It happens finally that central banks should have to 
navigate in turbulent water, between repressing inflationary pressures and preserving the 
financial system stability. 
Collectivizing private losses: who is paying the bill? 
 
As discussed above, the 2008 massive public interventions involved a transfer to the public 
sector (central banks and governments) of big amounts of private bad debts part of which will 
probably not be recovered. Also, public deficits were magnified because of the fall in fiscal 
revenues and induced expenditures. This raises the question of the distribution of the burden 
of the socialized losses. The answer actually depends on the way authorities decide to deal 
with the problems mentioned in the previous section. 
 
                                                 
8 In spite of a 12% unemployment rate in the UK, Keynes (1937) expressed his concern with possible 
inflationary pressures owing to the government proposal to finance rearmament partly by means of 
borrowed money. Today's possible inflationary pressures are related to the fact that the expansion of 
productive capacity is limited by the necessary delay for capital accumulation of course, not by the 
allocation of productive resources to the production of arms. 
9 See Asensio (2009b) for a detailed discussion. Note that an excess of money is also a demand-pull 
inflationary process in the neoclassical view, but it may happen before full employment in the Post 
Keynesian approach (while it cannot in the neoclassical one). Also, as Post Keynesians use to 
emphasize, inflation always has a distributive conflict side. In the present case the conflict holds in  
the incompatible claims for goods that results, at previous prices, from the excess amount of money. 
10 In the Global Finance Stability Report 2009 (pp 2-5) the International Monetary Fund reported how 
the 'risk appetite' had increased from April 2009. 
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As regards excess money, insofar as investments in extended capacities require some delay, 
authorities may decide to let inflation develop temporarily, until the real value of money has 
depreciated enough, in relation to the amount of unrecoverable debts. This solution preserves 
the economic activity and employment to the detriment of creditors, whose assets real value 
depreciate in proportion to the increase in prices. If on the other hand authorities decide not to 
allow for such a temporary increase in prices, unemployment is likely to be hit, as well as 
debtors, for interest rates have to go up in order to repress the inflationary pressures. 
 
As regard public deficits, governments for their part may decide to increase taxes so that 
fiscal revenues increase enough as to balance the government purchase of unrecoverable 
private debts and offset the fiscal losses the economic depression has generated. As 
government purchases of unrecoverable debts do not support economic activity at all, while 
taxes certainly reduce the private demand for goods and services, this solution eventually puts 
the burden on redundant people and taxpayers. If on the other hand current taxes do not 
compensate totally for the unrecoverable debt purchases and fiscal losses (which means an 
increase in public debt or a decrease in public capital holdings), unemployment rises to a 
lesser extent, and some inflation develops. 
 
Hence, central banks and governments should be faced with the well known 
inflation/unemployment dilemma, though with differentiated distributional effects. Notice that 
the fiscal and monetary responses which might be induced by the process of collectivization 
of losses per se would hardly support economic activity. It should on the contrary have 
depressive effects, for even if inflation and budget deficit were preferred, it would only spare 
restrictive measures such as tax and/or interest rates increases. The collectivization of losses 
therefore induces either depressive or stagflationary forces. 
 
III. Comparing fiscal orthodoxy and interventionism à la Keynes in the post-crisis context 
 
Restrictive fiscal policies: the next big threat 
 
The financial crisis thereby has seriously weakened the central banks and governments 
capacity to really support a recovery; worse, it started compelling several countries to 
implement restrictive measures and several others to seriously think about it. The mainstream 
policy principles indeed recommend a reduction of the public deficit and even a budget 
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surplus aimed at reducing the stock of the public debt, and thereby the sovereign debt risk 
premium. Such principles could make sense in a safe, full employment economy, as a way to 
stop the well known vicious circle: budget deficit – increased debt – increased risk premium – 
budget deficit... But in depressed economies, it is counterproductive to strive to reduce the 
budget deficit before the economy has recovered his strengths: as authorities become 
impatient to remove the budget deficit, the recovery becomes more difficult, fiscal revenues 
go down, inducing more spending cuts, weaker recovery and again less fiscal revenues... (fig. 
2)11
 
. Many countries experienced such pernicious dynamics when they were compelled to 
implement the so called 'stabilization programs'. 
                                                         sluggish recovery 
 
                                                                                                    (spending cuts) 
 
                                                    depressed fiscal revenues 
 
Figure 2 
 
Hence, spending cuts may worry financial markets much more, instead of reassuring them, for 
markets are aware that increasing idle capacities owed to spending cuts mean lower returns on 
investments, lower economic growth and possibly higher public deficits. Mainstream recipes 
could therefore increase the risk premia instead of reducing them. Only when the private 
aggregate demand engine is firmly launched could prudent cuts have a chance of reducing the 
public debts. Public debts have been magnified because of the exceptional depression caused 
by the financial turmoil. They will go down when normal conditions are recovered. If 
restrictive measures then remained necessary, they would be much weaker, much more 
bearable and therefore much easier to implement. Politicians must consider that public 
spending cuts in a period where the social needs for public assistance explode could produce 
serious troubles and damage further the state of confidence and the whole financial and 
economic system. 
 
Looking for solutions 
                                                 
11 At a national level, external demand may compensate for the depressed domestic demand if the 
international context is favorable, but such opportunity is much more unlikely to happen in the current 
international context where restrictive policies tend to become standard. 
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In the first times of a recovery, idle capacities use to allow firms to absorb increases in 
expected aggregate demand until the economy rejoins approximately the pre-crisis level of 
activity (or maybe an inferior level since some capacities may have been destroyed during the 
crisis). In this respect, the public support could be decisive, for it has been argued above that 
the private sector per se is likely to experiment a weakened 'entrepreneurial spirit' in the post-
crisis period. What is needed here is a public stimulus capable of sustaining the expected 
aggregate demand until it stands on its own two feet and the confidence in the production 
viability and profitability is completely restored. Several factors are likely to make 
expansionary policies much more effective in a depressed system. First, since the public 
stimulus helps restoring the expected profitability of the private productive investments, it 
should make the Keynes multiplier higher. Second, the share of the irrecoverable debts is 
likely to be finally much lower in a context of economic recovery, which reduces the source 
of the troubles. Third, strong economic recoveries induce fiscal revenues which may help 
governments to socialize private losses without having to increase taxes. Hence, insofar as a 
fast recovery generates important fiscal revenues, public deficits would not necessarily 
increase and could even decrease if the initial impact of the public support does not overcome 
the induced fiscal revenues (figure 3)12
 
. 
 
                                                             rapid recovery 
        stabilizing                                                                            (public support) 
        public debt 
                                                   balancing public accounts 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Once the economy is back on the rails, the challenge for authorities, as suggested above, is to 
escape the depressive / stagflationary forces the collectivization of losses involves. The need 
then is to favour the extension of aggregate demand and the related productive capacities in 
relation with the part of the excess money which has not been withdrawn for whatever reason. 
                                                 
12 Since the purpose is only to boost temporarily the state of affairs private initiatives, the initial 
deficit is only temporary while the future revenues are likely to persist once the growth trajectory is 
consolidated. 
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As the capital accumulation and the raising productive capacity might not be as fast as to 
cancel inflationary pressures immediately, it might be of interest to consider the possibility for 
governments to borrow from money holders, and then start progressively financing public 
investments and fiscal incentives for private investments, spreading expenditures over time so 
that the productive capacity of capital goods is never overwhelmed13
 
. 
Central Banks could have a major part in this respect if they got to keep long-term interest 
rates low enough14 so that investment financing is made as cheaper as possible (provided the 
credit-money finances safe/non inflationary investments of course). The danger would rather 
be that a restricted credit policy put the burden of past mistakes on current safe economic 
projects15
 
. It is possible nevertheless that low interest rates per se do not stimulate private 
investments very much, as investments also depend on the expected return on productive 
capital. Therefore, it is important that authorities show a determined commitment to engage in 
measures aimed at supporting private and public investments, especially in the domains where 
productive capacities are going to be insufficient, so that the expected demand and related 
profits increase substantially. 
Low long-term interest rates also prevent the dynamics of the debt to be unduly boosted16
                                                 
13 This amounts to transfer private purchasing power to the future in the spirit of the 'deferred pay' 
Keynes (1940) advocated in order to avoid the inflationary pressures owed to the shortage in 
productive capacities (since capacities were used in the armament industry instead of the production of 
goods and services). 
. It 
would be unjustifiable to let those markets which have caused great troubles and deteriorated 
public finances to decide punitive risk premia on sovereign debts, all the more since it would 
14 This is not assured according to Keynes's theory, for it requires the central bank policy to preserve 
the markets confidence (see Asensio 2009a for a detailed discussion). It might also require some 
capital controls in an open system. 
15 Interestingly, when there is an excess money that cannot be withdrawn, it is possible to fight the 
related inflationary pressures by means of lower interest rates (and public borrowing for public 
investments), since inflationary pressures can be considered the result of an insufficient productive 
capacity. 
16 On the complementary roles of the central bank and the Treasury in managing the public debt and 
the long term interest rates see Tily (2006, 2007 pp. 201-206). 
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suffice that central banks commit themselves to refinance public debts at normal rates for the 
markets calm down. It is the central banks responsability to prevent a situation where 
governments have no choice but to adopt depressive measures under the markets pressure in a 
fragile post-crisis context. Remember that public finances become safer as the recovery goes 
along, provided restrictive policies do not postpone the recovery (which would make the 
problem worse in the future). At the end of the day, who would approve that the central bank 
denied support to the government effort in favour of recovery and fragilized people, whereas 
the private financial sector was bailed out massively? 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first response authorities brought to the financial crisis got to stop the depressive effects 
on output and employment, but the public support to aggregate demand did not compensate 
for the private demand slump, as attested by the severe depression in those countries that have 
been involved in the financial turmoil. These countries accordingly struggle to reach the pre-
crisis utilization of productive resources, for, in the one hand, the dynamism of aggregate 
demand and the expected profits have been hit lastingly and, in the other hand, macro policies 
have been facing serious difficulties that reduced their room for manoeuvre. There is 
accordingly a temptation to implement restrictive policies in spite of the fragile recovery 
context. This is confining economies in a sluggish growth regime and could soon generate 
instability in the international monetary system, for it will be tempting to export difficulties by 
means of a currency competitive devaluations in the country where the internal demand is 
apathetic. 
 
What is needed, besides a safer financial regulation, differs in the immediate post-crisis 
recovery period and in the subsequent growth regime. The post-crisis recovery calls for a 
public stimulus capable of sustaining the expected aggregate demand until it stands on its own 
two feet and the confidence in the production profitability is completely restored. In the 
current context of depressed economies, this would be much more capable to reinforce banks 
and firms balance sheets, generate fiscal revenues and reduce social expenditures, and, 
eventually, to restore public finances and strengthen the economic growth. Afterwards, when 
the capacity utilization rejoins the pre-crisis level, the need will be to favour the extension of 
aggregate demand and the related productive capacities in relation with that part of the excess 
money which has not been withdrawn. Combining a low interest rate policy, provided it is 
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possible, with fiscal support would benefit to both the private inducement to invest and the 
public debt burden, thereby improving the policy effectiveness. It would be much better that 
countries could co-operate so that interest rates differentials and exchanges rates remain under 
control. Capital controls however are likely to be a necessary condition for national 
authorities having, at least temporarily, the capacity to resist to the market forces. The sooner 
aggregate demand will recover, the less capacities losses will damage the economies. 
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